- CBTC
- Concepts and reference
- Architecture and trust boundaries
Architecture and trust boundaries
Architecture at a glance
Section titled “Architecture at a glance”CBTC connects Bitcoin custody and event verification with private Canton contract workflows. This page owns the component map and trust boundaries. Lifecycle steps belong in How CBTC works; control requirements belong in CBTC security.
Component map
Section titled “Component map”| Component | Responsibility | Primary boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin addresses and transactions | Receive eligible deposits and deliver approved redemptions | Bitcoin transaction, fee, and confirmation behavior |
| Attestor Network | Verify eligible events and participate in threshold authorization | Independent operation, policy, and signing shares |
| CBTC workflow services | Associate accounts and events, coordinate workflows, and reconcile state | Authentication, availability, and correct state handling |
| Canton participants and parties | Host parties, contracts, and authorized commands | Canton identity, rights, topology, and privacy |
| CBTC Daml packages | Define holdings, transfers, accounts, credentials, and administrative behavior | Approved package versions and contract authorization |
| Client libraries and applications | Expose supported workflows and submit authorized requests | Pinned releases, credentials, validation, and retries |
| Proof of Reserve and reconciliation | Provide scoped evidence about reserves and system state | Completeness, freshness, source integrity, and stated limitations |
Trust boundaries
Section titled “Trust boundaries”Bitcoin custody
Section titled “Bitcoin custody”Underlying Bitcoin uses FROST threshold signing across independent Attestor Network operators. The threshold is configurable, and the operator set can change. Verify current operating details through the maintained security reference.
Attestor Network
Section titled “Attestor Network”Event verification and signing authorization are separate responsibilities. No single operator should be presented as sufficient to authorize a custody action. The detailed signing model belongs in CBTC Attestor Network and FROST.
Canton
Section titled “Canton”Canton records CBTC contract state and applies authorization through parties, participant rights, package logic, and topology. Configurable sub-transaction privacy limits contract visibility to entitled parties; it does not hide Bitcoin transactions.
Integration services
Section titled “Integration services”Clients authenticate separately to Canton and approved CBTC services. They must validate networks, parties, addresses, package compatibility, and authoritative state before retrying an ambiguous request.
Evidence
Section titled “Evidence”Proof of Reserve demonstrates only the evidence and observation scope documented on CBTC Proof of Reserve. It does not prove every application, custody, operational, or redemption property.
Architecture limits
Section titled “Architecture limits”This architecture does not by itself guarantee instant Bitcoin confirmation, every external service’s availability, correct integrator configuration, protection from an authorized request containing the wrong destination, or complete coverage by one evidence source.
Technical sources
Section titled “Technical sources”Related pages
Section titled “Related pages”- CBTC token standard and contract model
- CBTC Attestor Network and FROST
- CBTC Proof of Reserve
- CBTC security
Next step
Section titled “Next step”Review the control model: CBTC security.
Ask the docs
Answers come only from this documentation and can be wrong. Check the linked pages.
Ask a question about BitSafe, CBTC or the developer guides. For example: