Skip to content

Architecture and trust boundaries

How CBTC works

CBTC connects Bitcoin custody and event verification with private Canton contract workflows. This page owns the component map and trust boundaries. Lifecycle steps belong in How CBTC works; control requirements belong in CBTC security.

ComponentResponsibilityPrimary boundary
Bitcoin addresses and transactionsReceive eligible deposits and deliver approved redemptionsBitcoin transaction, fee, and confirmation behavior
Attestor NetworkVerify eligible events and participate in threshold authorizationIndependent operation, policy, and signing shares
CBTC workflow servicesAssociate accounts and events, coordinate workflows, and reconcile stateAuthentication, availability, and correct state handling
Canton participants and partiesHost parties, contracts, and authorized commandsCanton identity, rights, topology, and privacy
CBTC Daml packagesDefine holdings, transfers, accounts, credentials, and administrative behaviorApproved package versions and contract authorization
Client libraries and applicationsExpose supported workflows and submit authorized requestsPinned releases, credentials, validation, and retries
Proof of Reserve and reconciliationProvide scoped evidence about reserves and system stateCompleteness, freshness, source integrity, and stated limitations

Underlying Bitcoin uses FROST threshold signing across independent Attestor Network operators. The threshold is configurable, and the operator set can change. Verify current operating details through the maintained security reference.

Event verification and signing authorization are separate responsibilities. No single operator should be presented as sufficient to authorize a custody action. The detailed signing model belongs in CBTC Attestor Network and FROST.

Canton records CBTC contract state and applies authorization through parties, participant rights, package logic, and topology. Configurable sub-transaction privacy limits contract visibility to entitled parties; it does not hide Bitcoin transactions.

Clients authenticate separately to Canton and approved CBTC services. They must validate networks, parties, addresses, package compatibility, and authoritative state before retrying an ambiguous request.

Proof of Reserve demonstrates only the evidence and observation scope documented on CBTC Proof of Reserve. It does not prove every application, custody, operational, or redemption property.

This architecture does not by itself guarantee instant Bitcoin confirmation, every external service’s availability, correct integrator configuration, protection from an authorized request containing the wrong destination, or complete coverage by one evidence source.

Review the control model: CBTC security.